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Abstract 
The sanctions against Russia, beginning in early 2014, provide us with a unique opportunity to 
study whether, and how sanctions affect a vast territorial global superpower. This study attempts 
to empirically examine the economic impact of this event, paying particular attention to the 
existence or nonexistence of its regional heterogeneity. For these purposes, this study used a 
dataset from a survey that asked the executive managers of Russian regional companies to assess 
the impact on their management activities in late 2015. The key findings are as follows. First, 
approximately half of those interviewed perceived the economic sanctions as having a negative 
impact. Second, no regional variations in the impact of the sanctions could be found. It follows 
that financial sanctions, aimed at an entire nation, exert a significant and geographically uniform 
impact. Moreover, even regional businesses near the Asia-Pacific region, holding strong 
connections with Asian countries, cannot avoid its impact. 
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1. Introduction 
The Ukrainian crisis and the subsequent Russian annexation of the Crimean Peninsula 
sparked waves of Western sanctions in early 2014. In response to the intensifying conflicts 
in eastern Ukraine, the United States, and the EU in particular, escalated the severity of 
its response with more severe, comprehensive economic sanctions. The friendly 
relationship between Russian president Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump before the US 
presidential election, enhanced expectations that sanctions would be lifted sooner or later. 
The sanctions, however, have continued to be strengthened since then due to the 
deterioration of the political and economic environment of Russia. Furthermore, the new 
Russia sanctions bill was signed by the US President in August 2017, imposing strict 
limitations to the president’s ability to lift sanctions making it practically impossible.1 
Given this situation, it is highly likely that sanctions against Russia will continue to be in 
effect for a long time. 
It can also be expected that these unfavorable conditions will influence the 
Russian economy in various ways and will undermine its future development potential. 
Hence, the study of the impact of sanctions is increasing in importance. Highlighting the 
importance are the economic forecasts and policies being made by the Ministry of 
Economic Development of the Russian Federation given the continuation of the sanctions 
(Gurvich and Prilepskiy, 2018). Researchers, as well, attempt to quantify the impact of 
sanctions but do not reach a consensus: some find specific negative impacts on the 
Russian economy, while others evaluate the impact as quite marginal or sometimes 
negligible and not effective as a political tool (Gurvich and Prilepskiy, 2015; IMF, 2015; 
Shirov et al., 2015; Dreger et al., 2016; Kholodilin and Netsunajev, 2016; Tuzova and 
Qayum, 2016; Pestova and Mamonov, 2017, etc.). 
Major methodological difficulties here stem from various factors simultaneously 
affecting the current economic situation (Dreger et al., 2015; Nelson, 2017; Tuzova and 
Qayum, 2016). That is, the Russian economy started to slow down before the imposition 
of the sanctions against Russia, followed by external macroeconomic shocks, namely a 
significant decline in oil prices and a concomitant sharp depreciation of the Russian ruble. 
The industrial infrastructure highly dependent on natural resources, as an internal factor, 
                                                        
1 Public Law 115-44 “Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act” (CAATSA) is 
targeting Iran, Russia, and North Korea. 
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also leaves the Russian economy vulnerable to external factors. Due to the intertwined 
and interactive relationships between these factors, quantitative assessment of the impact 
of sanctions separately from other shocks is difficult and needs to be explored. 
In this paper, we attempt to empirically examine the impact of economic 
sanctions on the Russian economy and contribute to the literature in two ways. First, the 
majority of the earlier studies investigated Russia’s macroeconomic aspects mainly 
focusing on the relationships between growth, oil price, exchange rate, and economic 
sanctions, while the impact of sanctions is not sufficiently investigated at the micro-level: 
Ahn and Ludema (2017) and Golikova and Kuznetsov (2017) are among them. To tackle 
this research question, we gathered data by conducting an interview survey of Russian 
regional enterprises in late 2015. The use of the firm-level micro data enabled us to assess 
the impact of the sanctions in distinction from other factors. The extent of how much and 
transmission channels how the economic sanctions affect the Russian economy are to be 
empirically studied.  
Second, this study will focus on the regional aspects of the sanctions. As 
Golikova and Kuznetsov (2017) pointed out, its impact varies depending on the 
characteristics of economic agents, as much as other economic shocks. The characteristics 
necessarily include geographical factor where economic agents are located because 
Russia, has a tremendous territory, spreading from Europe to Asia. Russian regions are 
thought to be heterogeneous in terms of socio, demographic, and institutional settings 
(Leonard et al., 2016). According to World Bank (2018, p. 9), Russia’s unique economic 
geography resulted in a spatially uneven development which is not observed in other large 
countries. Zubarevich (2015) concluded that the potential impact of anti-Russian 
sanctions would be more severe in the peripheral regions taking into account geography. 
Considering these geographical factors, the possible regional variation of the impact of 
the sanctions should be empirically examined. Also, historically, targets of sanctions are 
small countries while this time sanctions are targeted at the world’s largest country and 
one of the superpowers of the world. Hence, this event provides us with a unique 
opportunity to study how sanctions affect the largest country with heterogeneous regions. 
In this paper, we will tackle these two research agendas, making use of original 
survey data. The Economic Research Institute of Northeast Asia (ERINA) conducted an 
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interview survey of 742 enterprises’ executive managers from 17 regions in late 2015.2 
The ERINA enterprise survey investigated how the executive managers evaluate the 
impact of sanctions on their management activities. Because the survey is designed to 
compare east and west regions at the firm-level, its use provides us with a unique 
opportunity to identify the determinants of the impact assessment of sanctions and to 
address the existence or not of its regional heterogeneity. 
The main findings are as follows. First, approximately half of the executive 
managers interviewed assessed the impact of economic sanctions negatively. Second, we 
cannot find any geographical variations in the shock. It follows that even regional 
businesses located near Asia-Pacific regions with strong relationships with non-sending 
countries cannot avoid the significant impact of economic sanctions. 
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly will overview 
the institutional aspect of the economic sanctions against Russia, and review earlier 
studies. Section 3 will introduce the ERINA enterprise survey and will show the summary 
results of the survey based on descriptive comparative analysis between regions. In 
section 4, we will proceed to an empirical analysis of the determinants of subjective 
evaluations on the impact of the economic sanctions using the ordered probit estimator. 
The Final section summarizes our key findings by presenting policy implications. 
 
2. Institutional Outlook and Literature Review of the Economic Sanctions against Russia 
Hufbauer et al. (2007), a classic on the scholarship of economic sanctions, argue that only 
one-third of economic sanctions succeeded to achieve their policy goals of forcing 
targeted countries to change their policies. As of March 2019, the economic sanctions 
against Russia continued to be in effect and did not lead to the settlement of the territorial 
disputes with Ukraine. Thus, we also limit the scope of this study to the investigation of 
the magnitude and transmission channels of their impact. The sending countries do not 
necessarily aim to force Russia to return the Crimean Peninsula. The US sanctions are 
said to aim to internationally isolate and economically damage Russia, whereas the EU, 
with stronger economic relations with Russia, hesitates to impose very harsh sanctions; 
instead it aims to demonstrate their objections (Veebel and Markus, 2016; Nelson, 2017). 
                                                        
2 GfK Russia, market research company based in Moscow, conducted the interview survey. 
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2.1 Overview of the Sanctions against Russia 
Aims of sanctions are classified into three: signaling, containment, and refrainment. At 
its initial stage, the sanctions against Russia are considered to demonstrate objections to 
the Russian government (signaling). Since the summer of 2014, the severity of the 
sanctions was strengthened to contain and refrain the Russian behavior, in response to the 
crash of the Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, intensifying armed conflicts in eastern Ukraine, 
and non-accomplishment of the Minsk II agreement (Dreyer and Popescu 2014).  
The scope of the sanctions, accordingly, has been gradually widened along three 
tiers. Diplomatic sanctions as the first tier include cancellation of international and 
governmental meetings, such as G8 (in March-April 2014). Restriction measures as the 
second tier ban travel and freeze assets of specific individual persons and groups based 
on the list of the targets (from March 2014). Initially, the targets were only those who 
were directly connected to the conflicts. However, the list was enlarged to include those 
who endanger the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of Ukraine, support 
policymakers, and gain benefits from such policies. This includes Russian and Ukrainian 
politicians, high ranking officials, military officers, separatists, and oligarchs. US 
President Donald Trump issued executive order No. 13660 on the Specially Designated 
Nationals and Blocked Persons (SDN) on 6th March 2014. This order prohibited trade 
with individual persons and groups on this list, banned their entrance to the US, and froze 
their assets. The number of targeted individuals and groups has been increasing by issuing 
successive executive orders (e.o. No. 13660, 13661, 13662, 13685) and by introducing 
Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).3 Meanwhile, the 
EU also issued several restrictive measures, imposing asset freezes and travel bans on 
those listed who undermine or threaten the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and 
independence of Ukraine.4 
                                                        
3 Listed targets of sanctions were initially 114 individuals and 24 entities, then increased to 237 
individuals, 457 entities, and 2 vessels as of March 2019. See the list:  
https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/. 
4 170 persons and 44 entities are subject to the restriction measures in March 2019 while they 
were initially only 21 individuals. See the list:  
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/ukraine-crisis/. 
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The third and final tier is the introduction of economic sanctions (from July-
September 2014). In the United States, the Treasury Office for Foreign Assets Control 
(OFAC), Bureau of Industry and Security of the Department of Commerce (BIS), and 
Directorate of Defense Trade Controls of the Department of State (DDTC) all enforce 
measures of their own. The OFAC imposes sectoral sanctions according to the Sectoral 
Sanctions Identification (SSI) list (e.o. No. 13662), targeting finance, energy, and defense 
sectors. Sanctions targeting finance prohibit capital transactions with Russia’s largest 
government-related banks when their maturity exceeds 30 days. Energy-related sanctions 
also prohibit major Russian banks from financial deals with a maturity exceeding 90 days. 
Research and development activities in the deep-water sea, the Arctic Ocean, the shale 
oils are prohibited. The BIS and the DDTC banned international trade of military-related 
commodities. The BIS makes a list of its own that partly overlaps the OFAC’s list, 
restricting the export license of energy resources.  
The EU’s sanctions went into effect July 2014, restricting Russian companies 
from entering the EU capital market and banned international trade of arms and providing 
advanced technology and services related to energy development. The EU as well 
imposes financial restrictions on the Russian state banks and prohibit EU citizens and 
companies from establishing new debt with a maturity exceeding 30 days. Additionally, 
EBRD stopped preferential financing and prohibited the export of dual-use goods. The 
conditions for lifting sanctions are to implement the Minsk II agreement fully. The similar 
sanctions measures are taken by Albania, Australia, Canada, Island, Japan, Liechtenstein, 
Montenegro, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and Ukraine.  
Russell (2018) points out the following major differences in sanctions imposed 
by the US and the EU. First, the EU allows the continuation of existing businesses, while 
the US prohibits them. Second, the EU limits the scope of sanctions in the energy sector 
to the oil industry, while US sanctions include the gas sector. Third, their lists of sanction 
targets are not the same although there is some overlap. Forth, the scope of US sanctions 
are more extensive than that of the EU and includes not only issues related to the 
Ukrainian crisis, but also those of human rights. Fifth, the EU’s measures are defined by 
the congressional laws, while the US’s are on presidential orders. According to Rapoza 
(2017), the objects of EU sanctions are EU citizens and companies only, in contrast to 
the US sanctions, which are applied abroad if they are engaged in international trade 
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using dollars via the US banks. In sum, the EU imposes more moderate sanctions with 
a narrower scope than the US.5 
 
2.2 Literature Review 
Economic sanctions are sometimes ineffective in terms of changing policies 
because sending countries tend to hesitate to impose harsh sanctions given their counter-
effects. Concurrently, target countries may avoid their impact by building an alternative 
relationship with other countries as a loophole when senders are limited to a specific 
group of countries. Considering these general arguments, many may view the impact of 
the anti-Russian sanctions rather moderate and instead tend to emphasize other factors to 
explain the current economic stagnation although it is difficult to separate effects of 
various factors. The reason is first, senders are only western countries including the EU, 
and second, Russia has been seeking to build stronger economic relations with the Asia-
Pacific region during Putin’s presidency. 
Despite limited empirical studies focusing on sanctions against Russia, 
macroeconomic time-series analyses tend to support these arguments. For example, 
Tuzova and Qayum (2016) and Pestova and Mamonov (2017) confirmed the marginal 
impact of sanctions on economic growth and trade. Dreger et al. (2016) concluded that 
the impact on the exchange rate is negligible while Kholodilin and Netsunajev (2016) 
showed that economic sanctions affect the growth rates of both of Russian and Euro-zone 
economies on the one hand and real effective exchange rate on the other hand. 
In contrast to most macro studies, Ahn and Ludema (2017), among a much-
limited number of empirical studies using the firm-level micro data, confirmed a 
somewhat stronger impact of sanctions. They showed that target companies reduced their 
revenues by one-third and asset values by half. Golikova and Kuznetsov (2017) 
confirmed that almost half of the companies investigated felt threatened by the risk of 
being negatively influenced by sanctions. They found that the size of the company and 
the geographical area of the business affect the firms’ assessment, which especially 
concerns large companies with access to international markets, engaging in business with 
                                                        
5 The EU’s sanctions are moderate because the member countries are afraid of its counter-effects 
although the impact varies among member countries (Hasselbach, 2014; Veebel and Markus, 
2016). 
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foreign partners. Whereas, small and medium enterprises engaged in local markets suffer 
much less from sanctions. 
We now briefly overview earlier studies not limited to empirical ones and 
summarize the range, mechanisms and transmission channels of the sanctions and how 
they affect business. As mentioned above, western sanctions against Russia have sectoral 
orientations (finance, energy, and military industries), and financial limitations are 
directly targeting at only the largest state banks. Thus, the scope of sanctions as designed 
are narrow and are not directly related to ordinary citizens, which would lead to the 
limited sphere of influences of sanctions theoretically. Connolly (2016) argued that the 
impact of sanctions is marginal because the number of banned import items are small, the 
Russian government increases state procurements, and sanctions in the energy sector do 
not matter in the short run. 
Some, however, discuss that sanctions cause more extensive damage (Dreyer and 
Popescu, 2014; Ershov, 2016; Shirov et al., 2015, etc.). There are several transmission 
channels. First, the targeted large state banks account for 55% of the total asset value in 
the banking sector, and more than 70% of Central Bank’s financing; meaning that almost 
half of the banking sector on cash balance is subject to the impact of sanctions (Orlova, 
2016). Under such conditions, companies and banks that were previously financed by 
target banks were forced to restructure or refinance their debt in the domestic capital 
market, which would, in turn, result in increased costs of financing in the domestic capital 
market and stronger market pressures on small and medium enterprises financing there.6 
Second, soft sanctions are considered to have a significant effect on a wide range 
of economic agents due to the over-compliance of western lenders and businesses 
(Johnson, 2015). The financial authorities of sending countries continuously strengthen 
their monitoring of financial transactions conducted by Russian businesses to see whether 
they are subject to the sanctions, leading to delays in settlements and the deterioration of 
the business environment. Foreign businesses hesitate to deal with Russian companies 
because they are afraid that their partners may become the target of the sanctions. 
                                                        
6 Zakirova and Zakirova (2018) confirmed that banks on the list of sanctions returned to domestic 
capital market for debt financing, causing increased demands and costs for domestic financing, 
which then resulted in deteriorating financial conditions of all companies including those not on 
the list. 
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Lastly, sanctions are expected to increase political, economic, and geopolitical 
uncertainties and risk premiums for investment in Russia (Ulyukaev and Mau 2015; 
Tuzova and Qayum 2016; Ahn and Ludema 2017). Such conditions stimulate households’ 
precautionary savings in foreign currencies. These together with decreases in inflows of 
foreign investments would undermine Russia’s prospects. 
Literature review here may lead to the expectation that sanctions negatively and 
widely affect the Russian economy either directly or indirectly with varying degrees even 
though its macroeconomic impacts may not be so visible. In these circumstances, 
geographical factors of the impact of sanctions are of interest. It is natural to expect that 
the impact of sanctions varies among regions, especially between regions. The western 
regions have close ties with western countries including countries sending sanctions 
whereas eastern regions are located near non-sending countries including rapidly 
developing China where Russia is carrying “Pivot to Asia” or “Turn to the East” policies. 
On the contrary, Gurvich and Prilepskiy (2015) and Mau (2016) argue that Asian 
businesses deal with Russian companies with caution because in the international capital 
market, Asian investors are also afraid of being targeted and they do not want to damage 
their relationship with western countries. 
 
3. Findings from the ERINA Enterprise Survey: West versus East 
The ERINA conducted an enterprise interview survey in the fourth quarter of 2015 to 
assess the potential for the economic development of the Russian Far East in comparison 
to the western part of Russia (see Arai and Iwasaki, 2018). Thus, the survey was designed 
to cover two different regions located at either end of the Russian territory, that is, eastern 
and western regions. Seventeen federal subjects were selected from the object areas of 
the survey interview so that the two regions are similar and comparable in terms of 
economic size (GRP), population, and number of enterprises (contrastive in terms of 
distance to the main domestic markets, and the demographic and economic densities).7 
The object of interviewed companies is only joint-stock companies or limited liability 
                                                        
7 The eastern region includes Primorsky krai, Khabarovsk krai, Zabaykalsky krai, Jewish A.O., 
Amur oblast, Irkutsk oblast, Republic of Sakha, and Republic of Buryatia. The western region 
includes Republic of Karelia, Arkhangelsk oblast, Vologda oblast, Leningrad oblast, Murmansk 
oblast, Novgorod oblast, Pskov oblast, Smolensk oblast, and Tver oblast. 
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companies with more than fifty employees. A total of 742 companies were selected from 
the regions. 
The executive manager of the company was interviewed face-to-face and asked 
to assess the overall and sectoral impact of the economic sanctions on their management 
activities based on five grades from definitely negative to definitely positive. Table 1 
summarized the results. The table on the top (a) confirmed that approximately half of the 
interviewed executive managers perceived the impact of sanctions as negative (47.4%, or 
344 companies out of 742). The proportion of those with a positive view of the impact is 
only 7.6%. Regional comparison of the survey results in Table 1 bottom (b) shows that 
there is little difference in the structure of the answer. The proportion of those with a 
negative impact in the west and east regions are 46.1% and 48.8%, respectively (the 
difference is only 2.8 percentage points). The chi-square test of independence supports 
that the relationship between two regions is insignificant at less than the 10 level. That is, 
the impact of economic sanctions is not negligible and geographically uniform. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
Table 1 likewise shows the results regarding various management activities, 
namely, sales, input procurement, attracting investment, labor force management, 
research and development (R&D), and international trade. The proportions of those with 
a negative impact are small and less than 20% in labor force management, R&D, and 
international trades while no impact exceeds 70% in these activities. On the other hand, 
the impact on sales, input procurement, and attracting investment are assessed more 
negatively, as the proportions are 37.8%, 41.8%, and 32.4%, respectively. Moreover, the 
impact assessment at the regional level differs too: the difference in negative impacts 
between two regions are small and only 2.6 percentage points in the labor force, 5.0 
percentage points in R&D, and 4.7 percentage points in international trade. In these 
activities, companies in the western region tend to perceive a more negative impact than 
those in the eastern region. In contrast, both regions showed a more substantial proportion 
of those with a negative impact on sales and input procurement; negative assessments in 
sales occupy 39.0% in the east and 36.7% in the west; in input procurement, 41.1% and 
42.4%, respectively. The chi-square tests of independence for each aspect of management 
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activities statistically confirmed the observations on the existence or not of regional 
heterogeneity. It leads to arguments here that the assessment of the impact of the 
economic sanctions, in general, is strongly dependent on its sectoral assessment 
especially on sales and input procurement. 
 
4. Determinants of the Impact of the Economic Sanctions and Its Regional Heterogeneity 
This section will identify the transmission channels and how the economic sanctions 
affect the impact assessment on the company’s management activities, with particular 
attention to the existence of not of regional heterogeneity. Here, our main hypothesis to 
be empirically examined is that the locational factor of the company does not affect the 
assessment of the executive manager. First, we will describe the data and the estimation 
strategy, and then will interpret the estimation results. 
 
4.1 Data and Estimation Strategy 
The list of data used in the estimation, definitions, and summary descriptive statistics are 
shown in Table 2. Table 2 contains the results of tests for equivalence and independence. 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
Data used are classified into dependent and six groups of independent variables. 
Dependent variables are defined as the executive managers’ subjective assessments of the 
impact of the economic sanctions on their management activities in general (sanction) 
and on various sectoral assessments, namely, sales, input (procuring input), investment 
(attracting investment), labor (labor force management), r&d (research and development), 
and trade (international trade). They are graded in increasing order from 0 (definitely 
positive impact), 2 (no impact), to 4 (definitely negative impact). As the dependent 
variables are categorical, we employ the ordered probit model using robust standard errors 
as follows: 
𝑦𝑦 =  𝜇𝜇 +  𝛽𝛽1𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 +  �𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=2
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀 , 
where 𝑦𝑦 is a dependent variable, 𝜇𝜇 is a constant term, 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 and 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 are independent 
variables and their coefficients, and 𝜀𝜀 is an error term. Estimation results using OLS and 
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ordered logit estimators are also reported for reference. This equation will also be applied 
to examine sectoral assessments of the impact. Then, determinants of the general 
assessment of the impact of sanctions are examined further by incorporating sectoral 
assessment on the right-side in order to consider the relationship between them. 
The first and foremost factor for our analysis is (1) the locational factor of the 
company. We introduce a dummy variable (east) which equals to 1 if the company is 
located in the eastern region and 0 if otherwise. The remaining five groups of independent 
variables are (2) basic characteristics of company, (3) industry dummies, (4) external 
financing, (5) market area, and (6) foreign trade partner. These variables are likely to be 
more or less concerned with economic sanctions. 
Basic characteristics of the company are a set of control variables, consisting of 
shares of state and foreign ownership (ownsta and ownfor, respectively), number of 
employees as a proxy for the size of the company, and dummy variable reflecting 
company’s business orientation to consumer sector (b2c). 
As western countries imposed sectoral sanctions on strategically essential 
industries, the sector to which the company belongs matters. Thus, (2) industry dummies 
are included in the estimation although it is impossible to distinguish defense companies 
in the dataset. We separately treat companies belonging to primary (agriculture, forestry, 
and fishery), secondary (mining, manufacturing, lifeline industry including electricity and 
water supply, etc.), and construction sectors. 8  Tertiary sector, consisting of trade, 
transport, and communications, is a default category. There are relatively more companies 
in the secondary sector in the eastern region while there are more companies of 
construction and tertiary sectors in the western region. 
Because another feature is that financial sanctions directly target major state 
banks, we control sources of external financing in the following classification: domestic 
banks including sub-groups, consisting of major banks, that is Sberbank and large banks 
located in Moscow or St. Petersburg, and regional banks. Some of the major banks are 
the target of the sanctions, and more or less serve as a dummy reflecting a targeted 
financing source; budget is expenditures from federal, regional, and municipal 
                                                        
8 The sectoral classification with 13 sub-industries is possible. We do not use this because this 
neither changes the estimation results, nor produce a statistically significant coefficient for each 
industry. 
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governments or extra-budgetary funds; funds are private investment funds and non-state 
pension funds; partner is defined as financing from partner companies including group 
or holding companies other than financial organizations. These financing sources are 
dummy variables, which take the value 1 if the largest financial source in 2014 (prior to 
the imposition of the sanctions) correspond to one of them, and zero if otherwise or no 
external financing. It can be expected that companies’ financing from the targeted major 
banks are subject to the impact of the sanctions. Table 3 shows the breakdown of the 
external financing sources of the surveyed companies. Almost half of them used an 
external source, mainly relying on financing by banks (about 40%). It is clear from Tables 
2 and 3 that companies in the western region used financing from major banks more than 
in the eastern region while the latter tend to rely more on regional banks and budget and 
non-budgetary funds. 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
Additionally, we will consider how the company works by using two kinds of 
variables. The first one is concerned with the range of business. It can be expected that 
companies primarily working in the local market will be less affected by the sanctions 
than those engaged in international trade. Meanwhile, the costs of trade within the vast 
territory of Russia may sometimes exceed international trade with a neighboring country, 
hence, we need to distinguish the range of market area (5) where the company mainly 
procures raw materials (inputrange) and sells their products (outputrange). Domestic 
businesses are divided into four, namely, that inside the city of the company’s location, 
outside the city and within the territory of the federal subject, beyond the boundary of the 
federal subject up to 3,000 km, and over 3,000 km. This ordinal variable takes the value 
from 0 to 4 according to its distance while international trade takes the value 5. 
Lastly, regions of the company’s trade partners are considered in following 
(multiple choice): Ukraine, CIS, Europe, US & Canada, Asia, and the rest of the world 
(row). The first four regions are against the Russian government and imposed sanctions, 
which may negatively affect business with these countries. In contrast, most of the Asian 
countries do not impose sanctions. Therefore, how a country or region of a trade partner 
affects the assessment of the impact should also be empirically examined. Table 4 
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summarizes the breakdown of the survey results by country having companies that are 
engaged in international business. The share of companies engaged in foreign trade is 
67.5% in total, 64.0% and 70.8% in eastern and western regions, respectively. This table 
shows a clear regional variation in trade partner which is affected by the location of the 
company: companies in east regions deal more with Asian countries whereas those in 
west region deal more with European counties. 
 
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
4.2 Estimation Results 
Table 5 shows the estimation results for the determining factors of the general sanctions-
impact assessment on management activities. Models [1] and [5] are baseline estimates, 
and the remaining models use detailed variables on external financing, market area, and 
trade partners. The ranges of market area for procuring raw materials (inputrange) and 
for selling products (outputrange) are examined in models from [1] to [4] and [5] to [8], 
separately. 
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
First and most importantly, a regional dummy variable (east) is statistically 
insignificant at less than the 10% in all models, indicating that the locational factor of the 
company does not affect the assessment; this corresponds to the findings from Table 1. It 
follows that the economic sanctions exerted a geographically uniform effect on a targeted 
economy independent of the region within the country because the sanctions, aimed at an 
entire nation, were an exogenous shock on its institutional framework. 
Second, the sanctions have varying effects on business depending on the sector 
and the financing source. These factors are directly or indirectly related to the content of 
the sanctions. The dummy variable for the primary sector is statistically significant and 
negative at less than the 5% level. Thus, companies working in agriculture and fishing 
suffer less and may benefit from this regime, in which import substitution policies and 
counter-sanctions of the government may also bolster. In contrast, companies financing 
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from domestic banks, and especially from major banks, tend to perceive a more negative 
impact as these dummy variables are statistically significant with positive signs at less 
than 5%.9 
Third and interestingly, none of the country or region dummies is statistically 
significant at less than 10%. The executive managers interviewed did not consider 
international trade with sending countries to be damaging to their management activities 
and, at the same time, felt that trade with Asian countries neither positively nor negatively 
affected the business.10 The effects on market areas are of interest as well. Table 5 shows 
that involvement in international trade neither improved nor worsened the assessment. 
On the contrary, narrower market areas for selling products within the territory of federal 
subjects and beyond it up to 3,000 km seem to reduce the negative impact assessment. As 
section 2 discussed, companies engaged in local markets suffer much less from the 
sanctions. The second and third findings are consistent with each other. 
Next, we turn to the impact assessment regarding various management activities. 
The estimation results are shown in Table 6. Primary findings are twofold. First, the 
regional dummy (east) is statistically insignificant in all but model [5] for R&D, the 
coefficient of which is statistically significant and negative at the 1% level. Second, all 
dummy variables identifying the countries of trade partners are statistically insignificant 
in all models except for [5]. These findings are consistent with the results shown in Table 
5 on the general assessment. Additionally, looking at each model for the sectoral 
assessment, we found that model [1] for sales is very similar to the results shown in the 
general assessment. It follows that the general assessment of the sanctions may stem from 
the assessment on sales via the financing source. 
 
 [Table 6 here] 
 
                                                        
9 The estimation using individual variables separately identifying Sberbank and capita banks 
shows that the company financed by capital banks statistically significantly and negatively 
assess the impact. 
10 Inclusion dummy variables for individual Asian countries (China, Japan, South Korea, and 
India) in the estimations do not produce statistically significant coefficient nor change the result, 
thus we omitted them from estimations. 
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At the end of this section, the relationship between the general and sectoral 
assessment is examined in Table 7. The estimation results support the previous results in 
terms of the regional factor, sectoral belongings, and external financing sources.11 It also 
confirmed that the relationship between them is statistically significant with a positive 
sign. Among others, the assessment of sales and investments has a much more negative 
effect on overall management. 
 
 [Table 7 here] 
 
From these arguments, we can conclude that the economic sanctions have a 
significant impact on Russian companies via restriction on the financing of domestic 
banks, especially major banks located in large cities working on an international capital 
market level, irrespective of the location of the company and the country of business 
partners. 
 
5. Conclusions 
Five years have passed since the introduction of western sanctions against Russia. During 
this period, political and economic conditions surrounding Russia have been trending 
unfavorably as the sanctions continue and are repeatedly strengthened. Thus, how and 
how much the sanctions affect the Russian economy is a matter of special attention for 
not only Russia but also the sending countries. 
In addition to the policy importance, it should also be emphasized that this time 
sanctions provide us with a really unique and rare opportunity for studying how much 
they affect the world’s largest country and one of the political, economic, and military 
superpowers, and whether they have a geographically varying effect within the country 
as well. These issues concern the current situation of Russia too. The Russian government 
is currently carrying “Turn to the East” policies and related regional development policies, 
counting on the strengthening of partnerships with Asia-Pacific countries, including 
China as the largest emerging economy in the world, will make up for recent economic 
losses. In this sense, how the sanctions have the impacted regions geographically and 
                                                        
11 Country dummy variable for trade partners are not included in the estimations as the inclusion 
of these variables do not change nor produce any statically significant results. 
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politically distant from the sending countries is of interest. 
From our empirical examinations, it can be said that the sanctions affect the 
Russian economy very negatively at least from the viewpoint of subjective assessment by 
managers. The survey results revealed that approximately half of the interviewed 
managers perceived the negative impact of the sanction to some extent. Risks and fears 
that the business circle is facing are not negligible and more or less affect the performance 
of their market, and consequently exert pressure on the government policy. 
Moreover, we found that the main transmission channels of the sanctions are 
associated with external financing sources and are independent of countries of trade 
partners. Western countries imposed financial restrictions on Russian business via 
selected banks, which in turn affect the entire banking sector. Among them, however, 
companies financed by major banks were hit harder by the sanctions. In contrast, trade 
relationships with non-sending countries of the sanctions do not lessen the severity of the 
impact assessment. Our findings confirm the arguments by Gurvich and Prilepskiy (2015) 
and Mau (2016) that Asian countries are also disinclined to deal with Russian companies 
fearing possible involvement in the sanctions. 12 These transmission channels of the 
sanctions generally apply to the various aspects of management activities. The impact on 
sales and investment, in particular, has a definitive role in the overall assessment. 
Last and most importantly, regional heterogeneity in the impact assessment of 
the sanctions cannot be identified by our analysis. Companies located in eastern and 
western regions negatively assessed the impact of economic sanctions at almost the same 
level. This is quite a serious problem for companies in the eastern region because they do 
not avoid or at least mitigate the impact of sanctions despite the recent prioritizing of the 
“Turn to the East” policy. The sanctions obstruct the pursuit of development policies 
targeted at the Far East regions. 
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Table 1 Survey results of the ERINA enterprise survey: assessments of the impact of economic sanctions on management activities 
(a) All surveyed companies 
Number Share (%) Number Share (%) Number Share (%) Number Share (%) Number Share (%) Number Share (%) Number Share (%)
definitely negative impact 77 10.6 41 5.9 65 9.3 44 6.5 8 1.1 6 1.1 19 4.0
rather negative impact 267 36.8 223 31.9 226 32.5 177 26.0 76 10.8 60 10.8 72 15.2
no impact 327 45.0 387 55.4 381 54.7 438 64.2 528 75.3 459 82.4 349 73.6
rather positive impact 48 6.6 37 5.3 21 3.0 20 2.9 73 10.4 23 4.1 23 4.9
definitely positive impact 7 1.0 11 1.6 3 0.4 3 0.4 16 2.3 9 1.6 11 2.3
hard to answer 16 - 43 - 46 - 60 - 41 - 185 - 268 -
total 742 100.0 742 100.0 742 100.0 742 100.0 742 100.0 742 100.0 742 100.0
International tradeSales of products and
services
Procurement of
resources and other
materials
Attracting investment Recruitment and
employment
Research and
Development
General assessment
 
(b) Regional comparison: share (%) 
East West East West East West East West East West East West East West
definitely negative impact 13.1 8.4 6.5 5.3 10.4 8.4 9.1 4.1 2.1 0.3 1.2 1.0 5.7 2.4
rather negative impact 35.8 37.7 32.5 31.4 30.7 34.1 22.7 28.8 8.5 12.9 7.9 13.1 11.0 19.0
no impact 44.8 45.3 55.4 55.3 56.1 53.5 63.7 64.7 77.9 73.0 81.7 83.0 75.3 72.1
rather positive impact 5.2 7.9 4.6 5.9 2.5 3.5 3.8 2.2 8.5 12.1 6.7 2.0 5.7 4.0
definitely positive impact 1.2 0.8 0.9 2.1 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.3 3.0 1.6 2.4 1.0 2.2 2.4
total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
test of independence: Chi-2 (1) 6.1 2.5 2.5 11.1 ** 12.7 ** 12.8 ** 9.1 *
Cramer's V 0.092 0.060 0.060 0.127 0.135 0.152 0.139
Sales of products and
services
Procurement of
resources and other
materials
Attracting investment Recruitment and
employment
Research and
Development
International tradeGeneral assessment
 
Note (1) The null hypothesis for the chi-square test of independence is that there is no regional difference in the assessment of the impact of sanctions on 
management activities. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Source: author’s compilation based on the ERINA enterprise survey. 
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Table 2 List of data employed in estimation: definition, descriptive statistics, and regional comparison 
dependent variables (1) the impact of economic sanctions on management activities
sanction general assessment 726 0.808 0 4 2.49 E>W * 6.121
sales sale 699 0.739 0 4 2.35 2.549
input input procurement 696 0.723 0 4 2.47 2.472
investment attracting investment 682 0.665 0 4 2.35 11.056 **
labor labor force management 701 0.591 0 4 1.98 12.739 **
r&d research and development 557 0.504 0 4 2.06 E≦W *** 12.813 **
trade international trade 474 0.660 0 4 2.14 9.096 *
independent variables
(1) region dummy: east a dummy for companies located in east region. 742 0.500 0 1 0.48 - -
(2) basic characteristics of company
ownsta  (2) ratio of state ownership 690 1.049 0 5 0.31 7.771
ownfor   (2) ratio of foreign investors' ownership 703 0.735 0 5 0.14 E≧W * 7.069
wornum  (3) the number of employees 742 0.920 0 3 0.63 E≧W *** 7.435 *
b2c a dummy for companies mainly engaged in B2C business 724 0.489 0 1 0.61 E≧W ** 5.068 **
(3) industry dummies
primary a dummy variable for company of primary sector 742 0.360 0 1 0.15 0.518
secondary a dummy variable for companyof secondary sector (excl. construction) 742 0.480 0 1 0.36 E≦W *** 11.158 ***
construction a dummy variable for company of construction 742 0.349 0 1 0.14 E≧W ** 5.713 **
(4) external financing a categorical variable of a main financing source below. 0 if  there is no external financing.
domestic bank domestic bank including major and regional banks 742 0.484 0 1 0.37 0.128
major bank major bank (sberbank and capital banks) 742 0.265 0 1 0.44 E≦W ** 4.018 **
regional bank regional bank 742 0.310 0 1 0.11 E≧W *** 11.638 ***
foreign bank foreign banks 742 0.097 0 1 0.01 0.082
budget budget and non-budgetary fund 742 0.136 0 1 0.02 E≧W *** 8.022 ***
fund private investment and pension fund 742 0.063 0 1 0.00 0.409
partner partner companies 742 0.177 0 1 0.03 E>W * 2.018
other other sources 742 0.126 0 1 0.02 0.015
(5) market area (4)
inputrange country or region where the biggest market (or client) for procuring inputs is located 680 1.126 0 4 1.43 E≧W *** 79.119
outputrange country or region where the biggest market (or client) for selling is located 732 1.075 0 4 1.09 E≦W * 48.334
(6) foreign trade partner (5) a dummy for business with countries below
ukraine Ukraine 733 0.151 0 1 0.02 E<W * 2.415
cis CIS countries (excluding Ukraine) 733 0.336 0 1 0.13 E≦W *** 29.370 ***
europe European countries 733 0.319 0 1 0.11 E≦W *** 22.282 ***
asia Asian countries 733 0.389 0 1 0.19 E≧W *** 82.261 ***
uscanada The US and Canada 733 0.110 0 1 0.01 0.047
row rest of the world 733 0.074 0 1 0.01 1.173
variable obs.
standard
deviation
Pearson's chi-
squared test (6)
max meanmindefinition
t -test of
equivalence (5)
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Notes 
(1) The impact of sanctions on management activities in general and its various activities are assessed 
as follows: 0: definitely positive; 1: rather positive; 3: no impact; 4: rather negative; 5: definitely 
negative. 
(2) This ordinal variable takes the following value according to the share of ownership: 0: 0%; 1: 10% 
or less; 2: 10.1-25％; 3: 25.1-50％; 4: 50.1-75％5: 75％ or more. 
(3) This ordinal variable takes the following value according to the number of employees: 0: 50-99 
persons; 1: 100-249 persons; 2: 250-499 persons; 3: 500 persons or more. 
(4) This ordinal variable takes the following value according to the distance of market area: 0: inside 
the city; 1: inside the federal subject; 2: in another federal subject up to 3,000 km; 3: over 3,000 km; 
4: abroad. 
(5) Dummy variables take the value 1 if the company is engaged in trade activities with the country 
listed (multiple choice). 
(6) The null hypothesis for t-tests of equivalence is that means are the same in eastern (E) and western 
(W) regions. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. 
(7) The null hypothesis for the chi-square test of independence is that there is no regional difference 
regarding variables shown. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Source: author’s compilation based on the ERINA enterprise survey 
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Table 3 Main external financing sources of the surveyed companies 
number of
companies
share (%) number of
companies
share (%) number of
companies
share (%)
Total 724 100.0 345 100.0 379 100.0
bank 284 39.2 139 40.3 145 38.3
domestic banks 277 38.3 136 39.4 141 37.2
major banks 197 27.2 83 24.1 114 30.1
sberbank 81 11.2 35 10.1 46 12.1
capital banks 116 16.0 48 13.9 68 17.9
regional banks 80 11.0 53 15.4 27 7.1
foreign banks 7 1.0 3 0.9 4 1.1
budget and non-budgetary fund 14 1.9 12 3.5 2 0.5
private investment and pension fund 3 0.4 2 0.6 1 0.3
partner companies 24 3.3 15 4.3 9 2.4
other 12 1.7 6 1.7 6 1.6
no external financing 387 53.5 171 49.6 216 57.0
West regionAll surveyed companies East region
 
Note: the executive managers of the surveyed companies were asked to identify the main external 
financing source in 2014 (the period before the imposition of economic sanctions). 
Source: author’s compilation based on the ERINA enterprise survey 
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Table 4 Countries and regions of trade partners 
number of
companies
share (%) number of
companies
share (%) number of
companies
share (%)
Total 742 100.0 358 100.0 384 100.0
not engaged in foreing trade 501 67.5 229 64.0 272 70.8
engaged in foreign trade 232 31.3 123 34.4 109 28.4
region or country of trade partner
Ukraine 17 2.3 5 1.4 12 3.1
CIS (excluding Ukraine) 92 12.4 20 5.6 72 18.8
Kazakhstan 26 3.5 4 1.1 22 5.7
Belarus 72 9.7 12 3.4 60 15.6
other 31 4.2 10 2.8 21 5.5
Asia 136 18.3 113 31.6 23 6.0
China 118 15.9 98 27.4 20 5.2
India 25 3.4 21 5.9 4 1.0
Japan 40 5.4 36 10.1 4 1.0
South Korea 55 7.4 51 14.2 4 1.0
Australia 2 0.3 0 0.0 2 0.5
Other 13 1.8 9 2.5 4 1.0
Europe 84 11.3 20 5.6 64 16.7
EU countries 77 10.4 20 5.6 57 14.8
non-EU countries 16 2.2 3 0.8 13 3.4
US and Canada 9 1.2 4 1.1 5 1.3
Other 5 0.7 3 0.8 2 0.5
South America 1 0.1 0 0.0 1 0.3
other 4 0.5 3 0.8 1 0.3
number of partners
1 159 21.4 93 26.0 66 17.2
2 47 6.3 20 5.6 27 7.0
3 17 2.3 8 2.2 9 2.3
4 or more 9 1.2 2 0.6 7 1.8
West regionEast regionAll surveyed companies
 
Note: the executive managers of the surveyed companies were asked to answer whether they were 
engaged in international business with companies of listed countries (regions). 
Source: author’s compilation based on the ERINA enterprise survey 
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Table 5 Results on the general assessment of the impact of economic sanctions (1) 
(1) region dummy: east 0.093 0.032 0.021 0.027 0.103 0.052 0.035 0.060
(0.090) (0.112) (0.080) (0.194) (0.088) (0.105) (0.075) (0.184)
(2) basic characteristics
ownsta 0.021 0.041 0.028 0.060 0.020 0.037 0.026 0.062
(0.044) (0.046) (0.033) (0.081) (0.042) (0.044) (0.032) (0.079)
ownfor -0.117 *** -0.106 ** -0.073 *** -0.201 *** -0.099 ** -0.085 ** -0.058 ** -0.161 **
(0.039) (0.042) (0.028) (0.069) (0.042) (0.043) (0.029) (0.072)
b2c 0.178 * 0.149 0.104 0.223 0.166 * 0.115 0.082 0.175
(0.092) (0.093) (0.066) (0.163) (0.089) (0.091) (0.065) (0.161)
wornum -0.182 *** -0.203 *** -0.140 *** -0.369 *** -0.161 *** -0.174 *** -0.121 *** -0.322 ***
(0.056) (0.059) (0.041) (0.113) (0.055) (0.056) (0.039) (0.108)
(3) industry dummies
primary -0.530 *** -0.479 *** -0.331 *** -0.773 ** -0.517 *** -0.449 *** -0.316 *** -0.763 ***
(0.156) (0.164) (0.116) (0.314) (0.147) (0.151) (0.108) (0.288)
secondary -0.043 -0.041 -0.026 -0.115 0.008 0.033 0.025 -0.002
(0.104) (0.107) (0.076) (0.186) (0.101) (0.104) (0.073) (0.182)
construction 0.176 0.189 0.130 0.318 0.204 * 0.194 0.133 0.316
(0.124) (0.130) (0.093) (0.227) (0.121) (0.126) (0.090) (0.222)
(4) external financing (2)
domestic bank 0.252 ** 0.243 ***
(0.097) (0.093)
major bank 0.300 *** 0.212 *** 0.604 *** 0.297 *** 0.207 *** 0.572 ***
(0.112) (0.079) (0.198) (0.107) (0.075) (0.193)
regional bank 0.106 0.070 0.117 0.115 0.076 0.120
(0.159) (0.114) (0.299) (0.157) (0.112) (0.289)
foreign bank 0.116 0.012 0.000 0.018 0.045 -0.186 -0.137 -0.375
(0.378) (0.396) (0.278) (0.717) (0.301) (0.362) (0.251) (0.653)
budget 0.567 * 0.529 * 0.367 0.939 * 0.573 * 0.545 0.379 0.959
(0.335) (0.317) (0.224) (0.557) (0.335) (0.332) (0.236) (0.586)
fund -1.469 *** -1.431 *** -0.985 *** -2.574 *** -1.427 *** -1.413 ** -0.969 ** -2.594 **
(0.474) (0.454) (0.338) (0.936) (0.443) (0.582) (0.442) (1.168)
partner 0.933 *** 0.895 *** 0.623 *** 1.504 *** 0.819 *** 0.857 *** 0.593 *** 1.453 ***
(0.206) (0.215) (0.146) (0.360) (0.205) (0.214) (0.147) (0.356)
other 0.389 0.326 0.230 0.653 0.392 0.458 0.321 0.832
(0.360) (0.387) (0.270) (0.729) (0.358) (0.397) (0.280) (0.786)
(5) market area (3)
inside subjects 0.036 0.024 0.087 -0.257 ** -0.178 ** -0.417 ***
(0.126) (0.089) (0.229) (0.107) (0.076) (0.189)
up to 3,000km 0.059 0.041 0.145 -0.404 ** -0.281 ** -0.558 ***
(0.153) (0.108) (0.273) (0.160) (0.116) (0.279)
over 3,000km 0.232 0.161 0.425 0.233 0.163 0.414
(0.163) (0.115) (0.296) (0.210) (0.148) (0.386)
international 0.195 0.245 0.169 0.373 -0.087 -0.335 -0.232 -0.539
(0.195) (0.234) (0.165) (0.400) (0.166) (0.196) (0.138) (0.355)
(6) trade partner countries (4)
ukraine -0.024 -0.023 -0.200 -0.055 -0.039 -0.218
(0.325) (0.232) (0.573) (0.269) (0.192) (0.486)
cis  (excl. ukraine ) -0.084 -0.058 -0.151 -0.009 -0.006 -0.041
(0.153) (0.108) (0.278) (0.140) (0.099) (0.259)
asia 0.146 0.103 0.297 0.138 0.098 0.302
(0.161) (0.114) (0.295) (0.163) (0.116) (0.303)
europe -0.016 -0.007 -0.052 -0.021 -0.012 -0.046
(0.171) (0.122) (0.314) (0.164) (0.117) (0.299)
uscanada -0.170 -0.127 -0.059 -0.191 -0.153 -0.215
(0.553) (0.408) (1.108) (0.497) (0.371) (1.028)
row -0.037 -0.012 0.058 -0.258 -0.173 -0.395
(0.487) (0.345) (0.836) (0.363) (0.256) (0.663)
constant 2.424 *** 2.539 ***
(0.104) (0.095)
N 617 610 610 610 661 654 654 654
Wald chi2; F-statistics(5) 91.9 *** 93.31 *** 3.99 *** 89.15 *** 82.29 *** 92.14 *** 3.78 *** 82.51 ***
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Pseudo R2 (R2)(6) 0.046 0.048 0.108 0.048 0.042 0.052 0.117 0.050
Model [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]ordered probit ordered probit OLS ordered logit ordered probit ordered probit OLS ordered logit
inputrange outputrange
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Notes 
(1) ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. The values 
in the parentheses are robust standard errors. 
(2) The default category is no external financing. 
(3) The effect of market areas for procuring raw materials and for selling products are examined 
separately. In models [1] and [5], the default category is domestic business, while a default category 
is a business within a city in remaining models. 
(4) Individual countries or regions of partners are not considered in models [1] and [5]. 
(5) F-test results are shown in models [3] and [7]. 
(6) R-squared for models [3] and [7]. 
Source: author’s estimation
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Table 6 Results on the sectoral assessment of the impact of economic sanctions (1) 
Model: ordered probit
dependent variables
(1) region dummy: east 0.164 -0.048 0.008 0.082 -0.382 *** -0.064
(0.111) (0.109) (0.122) (0.119) (0.146) (0.143)
(2) basic characteristics
ownsta 0.097 ** 0.079 * 0.085 0.243 *** 0.087 0.089
(0.042) (0.044) (0.052) (0.046) (0.064) (0.056)
ownfor -0.185 *** -0.162 ** -0.050 -0.075 -0.101 * -0.062
(0.043) (0.055) (0.057) (0.051) (0.052) (0.043)
b2c -0.054 0.012 0.022 0.110 -0.115 -0.121
(0.098) (0.100) (0.104) (0.101) (0.127) (0.127)
wornum -0.208 *** -0.079 -0.012 -0.114 ** 0.045 -0.085
(0.053) (0.055) (0.060) (0.056) (0.064) (0.069)
(3) industry dummies
primary -0.413 ** -0.175 -0.112 0.020 -0.398 * -0.357 *
(0.165) (0.152) (0.171) (0.176) (0.208) (0.215)
secondary -0.029 0.024 0.092 0.200 * -0.067 -0.037
(0.108) (0.110) (0.113) (0.114) (0.149) (0.143)
construction 0.214 0.088 0.492 *** 0.337 ** 0.091 -0.142
(0.135) (0.147) (0.154) (0.166) (0.191) (0.169)
(4) external financing (2)
major bank 0.180 * 0.073 0.275 ** -0.096 0.064 0.098
(0.110) (0.108) (0.115) (0.122) (0.141) (0.152)
regional bank 0.112 -0.029 0.138 -0.360 ** 0.049 0.161
(0.151) (0.165) (0.174) (0.164) (0.230) (0.208)
foreign bank 0.535 * -0.098 0.588 0.147 0.128 0.374
(0.312) (0.367) (0.452) (0.150) (0.354) (0.403)
budget -0.156 0.728 ** 0.588 * 0.040 0.906 * -0.194
(0.253) (0.347) (0.352) (0.406) (0.472) (0.187)
fund 1.113 0.990 0.688 1.039 1.367 ** 0.094
(1.020) (1.108) (0.563) (0.705) (0.633) (0.242)
partner 1.191 *** 0.788 *** 0.871 *** 0.160 1.040 *** 0.395
(0.245) (0.239) (0.277) (0.310) (0.361) (0.275)
other -0.433 -0.099 0.268 -0.240 * 0.407 0.028
(0.370) (0.340) (0.409) (0.146) (0.297) (0.333)
(5) market area: outputrange
inside subjects 0.057 0.018 0.147 0.021 0.039 -0.106
(0.108) (0.110) (0.123) (0.124) (0.147) (0.133)
up to 3,000km -0.214 -0.140 -0.249 0.062 -0.299 -0.456 **
(0.164) (0.182) (0.173) (0.173) (0.208) (0.230)
over 3,000km 0.700 *** 0.690 *** 0.184 0.067 0.705 *** 0.362
(0.225) (0.209) (0.224) (0.217) (0.269) (0.264)
international -0.119 0.142 -0.561 *** 0.213 0.274 0.112
(0.237) (0.210) (0.207) (0.194) (0.228) (0.289)
(6) trade partner countries
ukraine 0.455 0.197 0.506 -0.288 0.606 * 0.570
(0.340) (0.340) (0.344) (0.272) (0.361) (0.447)
cis  (excl. ukraine ) 0.081 -0.040 0.206 0.062 0.013 0.147
(0.150) (0.155) (0.149) (0.144) (0.193) (0.208)
asia -0.027 0.189 0.196 -0.146 -0.119 0.032
(0.164) (0.146) (0.156) (0.168) (0.197) (0.212)
europe -0.203 0.089 -0.142 0.008 -0.055 -0.139
(0.156) (0.165) (0.157) (0.164) (0.184) (0.231)
uscanada 0.222 -0.371 -0.372 -0.206 -0.199 0.096
(0.624) (0.537) (0.660) (0.327) (0.213) (0.582)
row -1.059 -0.762 -1.224 -1.390 * -0.963 * -0.237
(1.040) (0.895) (1.404) (0.811) (0.496) (0.925)
N 632 628 615 629 501 426
Wald chi2 111.43 *** 50.33 *** 70.58 *** 58.14 *** 54.92 *** -
Pseudo R2 0.065 0.034 0.053 0.0449 0.070 0.039
[6]
sales input investment labor r&d trade
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
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Notes 
(1) ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. The values 
in the parentheses are robust standard errors. 
(2) The default category is no external financing. 
Source: author’s estimation
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Table 7 Results on the interrelation of the general and sectoral assessments of the impact 
of the economic sanctions (1) 
0.831 *** 0.578 *** 0.687 *** 0.223 ** 0.425 *** 0.574 ***
(0.080) (0.071) (0.074) (0.094) (0.123) (0.094)
(1) region dummy: east 0.035 0.088 0.089 0.098 0.121 -0.070
(0.097) (0.097) (0.098) (0.096) (0.107) (0.116)
(2) basic characteristics
ownsta -0.033 -0.005 -0.034 -0.018 -0.056 -0.090
(0.045) (0.045) (0.047) (0.044) (0.046) (0.057)
ownfor -0.040 -0.086 ** -0.086 ** -0.099 ** -0.097 ** -0.079 *
(0.052) (0.041) (0.038) (0.042) (0.045) (0.046)
b2c 0.227 ** 0.203 ** 0.177 * 0.177 * 0.207 ** 0.293 **
(0.098) (0.096) (0.095) (0.093) (0.105) (0.121)
wornum -0.115 ** -0.157 *** -0.185 *** -0.147 *** -0.162 *** -0.136 **
(0.057) (0.055) (0.059) (0.056) (0.063) (0.069)
(3) industry dummies
primary -0.292 ** -0.496 *** -0.531 *** -0.552 *** -0.402 ** -0.255
(0.147) (0.152) (0.154) (0.153) (0.161) (0.175)
secondary 0.057 0.008 -0.050 -0.039 -0.004 0.071
(0.107) (0.106) (0.107) (0.105) (0.120) (0.130)
construction 0.136 0.168 0.001 0.149 0.270 * 0.284
(0.139) (0.129) (0.132) (0.128) (0.143) (0.175)
(4) external financing (2)
major bank 0.276 ** 0.288 *** 0.190 * 0.329 *** 0.229 * 0.214
(0.111) (0.110) (0.112) (0.110) (0.120) (0.138)
regional bank 0.132 0.170 0.073 0.213 0.144 0.140
(0.154) (0.153) (0.157) (0.159) (0.180) (0.199)
foreign bank -0.303 -0.018 -0.329 -0.050 -0.091 -0.226
(0.460) (0.331) (0.223) (0.348) (0.377) (0.414)
budget 0.669 ** 0.302 0.379 0.575 * 0.541 0.689
(0.335) (0.376) (0.349) (0.320) (0.462) (0.587)
fund -2.269 ** -1.914 ** -1.804 ** -1.533 ** -1.607 * -0.671 ***
(1.134) (0.976) (0.859) (0.693) (0.833) (0.225)
partner 0.384 0.577 ** 0.618 ** 0.896 *** 0.794 *** 0.837 ***
(0.279) (0.233) (0.262) (0.225) (0.253) (0.282)
other 0.670 0.520 0.466 0.521 0.442 0.583
(0.442) (0.352) (0.373) (0.367) (0.358) (0.433)
(5) market area: outputrange
inside subjects -0.295 *** -0.237 ** -0.268 ** -0.201 * -0.146 -0.304 **
(0.115) (0.113) (0.113) (0.110) (0.123) (0.136)
up to 3,000km -0.314 * -0.375 ** -0.362 ** -0.394 ** -0.562 *** -0.396 *
(0.162) (0.167) (0.170) (0.163) (0.180) (0.209)
over 3,000km -0.164 -0.141 0.014 0.116 0.094 0.143
(0.193) (0.198) (0.209) (0.214) (0.230) (0.228)
international -0.182 -0.339 -0.126 -0.287 -0.259 -0.353 *
(0.194) (0.215) (0.200) (0.187) (0.231) (0.201)
N 633 629 617 630 503 426
Wald chi2 170.46 *** 157.15 *** 160.22 *** 96.31 *** 87.39 *** -
Prob > chi2 0 0 0 0 0 .
Pseudo R2 0.153 0.1035 0.1116 0.0591 0.0705 0.096
Log pseudolikelihood -642.975 -669.7411 -649.0624 -704.7617 -546.1452 -447.8714
r&d tradethe impact assessment of various
management activities
sales input investment labor
[3] [4] [5] [6]
sanction sanction sanction sanction sanction sanction
Model [1] [2]
 
Notes 
(1) ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10% levels, respectively. The values 
in the parentheses are robust standard errors. 
(2) The default category is no external financing. 
Source: author’s estimation 
